I. INTRODUCTION
When a state is engaged in an armed conflict, one of the most important activities that the state may undertake is detention. The most familiar type of detention during armed conflict is the detention by one state of its opponent's armed forces: when possible, a state's armed forces will detain 1 However, there are a number of other situations in which states engaged in armed conflict may detain persons without necessarily bringing criminal charges against them. 2 This article refers to this type of detention as "administrative detention." First, in international armed conflict, a state may detain certain civilians who appear to pose a security threat to that state. The 1949 Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention) expressly contemplates that states will undertake such detentions of civilians. Second, in non-international armed conflict, the state may detain individuals engaged in hostile acts against it, such as armed rebels and individuals that the state deems a serious threat to security. 3 Third, individuals detained as belligerents in international armed conflict-but who are not entitled to prisoner of war status-may face detention without criminal charge until the end of hostilities. 4 A limited set of treaty rules prescribes the procedures a state must follow in determining when, how, and for how long it may administratively detain individuals during armed conflict. While the procedural rules for administrative detention contained in the Fourth Geneva Conventionwhich apply to "protected persons" in international armed conflict-are reasonably robust, only a very limited set of treaty rules applies to administrative detention in non-international armed conflicts. 5 Rather, detention in 1 Like the Fourth Geneva Convention, however, the Third Geneva Convention does not provide much guidance about the procedural requirements for detaining an individual; rather, the treaty focuses primarily on how a state must treat individuals it detains as prisoners of 2 This article does not take a position on whether or when a state should try to prosecute individuals it has administratively detained. Nor does it take a view on whether the statespecific administrative detention rules discussed herein meet, exceed, or fall short of international human rights obligations a state may have. 3 Although not the primary focus of this article, there are situations short of armed conflict-such as states of emergency-in which states detain individuals outside of the typical criminal process. See infra Part IV (discussing whether common detention guidelines for armed conflict should apply to situations short of armed conflict). 4 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 31 (1942) ("Unlawful combatants are . . . subject to capture and detention . . . . "). 5 See generally Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 1. The Fourth Geneva Convention's procedural rules on administrative detention technically apply only to "protected per-
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non-international armed conflict is governed almost exclusively by a state's domestic law. 6 Given the dearth of rules in non-international armed conflict, a lawyer for the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has proposed a set of procedural principles that states should apply to all cases of administrative detention, whether that detention occurs during armed conflict (either international or non-international) or outside of armed conflict entirely.
7
The ICRC paper, which contains some fifteen recommended principles and safeguards, is relatively ambitious in the rules it would have states apply to administrative detention, especially when that detention occurs during an armed conflict. For example, the paper urges that administrative detainees be provided with legal representation, and that detainees and their legal representatives be able to attend review proceedings in person. 8 While this might be desirable, states that detain thousands of individuals at a time on a battlefield would find these requirements very difficult to meet.
This article concludes that the core procedures contained in the Fourth Geneva Convention are battle-tested and serve as an excellent basis for administrative detention during all types of armed conflict. These procedures impose a high standard for a state to initially detain, require the state to immediately review that detention, permit the detainee to appeal the initial detention decision, require the state to review the detention periodically, and obligate the state to release the detainee when the reasons for his detention have ceased. Coupled with a requirement to inform a detainee of the reasons for his detention, this collection of procedures would offer a strong and operationally-sustainable standard for administrative detention. Adopting such baseline rules (as matter of clearly-stated policy, if not legal obligation) would ensure that all states strike the proper balance between national security and personal liberty, would let states avoid answering hard questions about the type of armed conflicts they are fighting, and might sons," but that category encompasses virtually all civilians in a state's hands during international armed conflict or occupation, either in occupied territory or the territory of a party to the conflict. Id. at art. 4. 6 This means that a state's international human rights obligations generally will attach to such detention. For instance, a state that is party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and is conducting administrative detentions in its territory will need to comply with that treaty's baseline requirements for detention without charge, unless it has derogated from those obligations. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, arts. 4 and 9(1), Dec. 19, 1966, 999 Part II of this article describes the treaty rules that govern administrative detention during armed conflict. Part III explores real world examples of administrative detention during armed conflict both by international forces and by individual states, without assessing whether any particular practices have become customary international law. Part IV explains why the core principles of the Fourth Geneva Convention are an appropriate source of rules for administrative detention in all types of armed conflict, and raises certain questions that require further exploration.
II. TREATY RULES GOVERNING ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION
A. International Armed Conflict
The most robust set of treaty rules governing administrative detention is found in treaties that apply to international armed conflict. The Fourth Geneva Convention and the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Additional Protocol I) establish rules for administrative detention in international armed conflict for the parties to those treaties. 9 Various articles in the Fourth Geneva Convention establish the standards for administratively detaining and releasing an individual; a requirement for review of and appeal from the initial detention decision; and a mandated periodic reconsideration of the state's decision to detain. Slightly different rules appear in Articles 42 and 43 of the Fourth Convention, which govern detention in the territory of a party to the conflict, and in Article 78, which governs detention in occupied territory. Article 75 of Additional Protocol I adds a requirement that a state advise the detained individual of the reasons for his detention.
1.
Fourth Geneva Convention a.
Standard for detention
The Fourth Geneva Convention establishes a high standard for detaining a civilian, whether in occupied territory or in the territory of a party It did not seem possible to define the expression "security of the State" in a more concrete fashion. It is thus left very largely to Governments to decide the measure of activity prejudicial to the internal or external security of the State which justifies internment or assigned residence. Subversive activity carried on inside the territory of a Party to the conflict or actions which are of direct assistance to an enemy Power both threaten the security of the country; a belligerent may intern people or place them in assigned residence if it has serious and legitimate reason to think that they are members of organizations whose object is to cause disturbances, or that they may seriously prejudice its security by other means, such as sabotage or espionage . . . .
11
The rule is slightly different for occupying powers in occupied territory. In that case, "if the Occupying Power considers it necessary, for imperative reasons of security, to take safety measures concerning protected persons, it may, at the most, subject them to assigned residence or to internment."
12 The Commentary to Article 78 explains that this article sets a higher standard than Article 43 for a state to detain a person: "In occupied territories the internment of protected persons should be even more exceptional than it is inside the territory of the Parties to the conflict; for in the former case the question of nationality does not arise."
13
Embedded in these rules is the unstated requirement that a person must be detained based on the particularities of his situation. For instance, a state may not detain a person for something his neighbor has done, or use a person as a bargaining chip to obtain the release of a detainee held by the opposing state. Nevertheless, the Commentary to Article 42 contemplates that someone may be detained because he is a member of a particular group, regardless of whether he undertakes specific hostile acts that threaten the security of the state.
Both Virtually all detentions take place in the field-during routine military patrols, for instance, or during a raid on a home or business. While in each case the detaining force should only detain those individuals who pose an imperative threat to security, the Fourth Geneva Convention implicitly recognizes that states will make mistakes in the field. Thus, the Fourth Geneva Convention contemplates that, after a state's military or other forces detain an individual for security reasons, that individual has a near-term ability to challenge that detention before a court or an administrative board (at the choice of the state).
For aliens in the territory of a party to the conflict, Article 43 provides that "[a]ny protected person who has been interned or placed in assigned residence shall be entitled to have such action reconsidered as soon as possible by an appropriate court or administrative board designated by the Detaining Power for that purpose. (consisting of more than one person), but specifies that the review must be independent and impartial. Specifically, the Commentary states:
The State may act either through the courts or through administrative channels. The existence of these alternatives provides sufficient flexibility to take into account the usage in different States. The Article lays down that where the decision is an administrative one, it must be made not by one official but by an administrative board offering the necessary guarantees of independence and impartiality.
17
This initial review decision is not automatic, but once the detainee requests it, the review must be prompt. The Commentary to Article 43 states: "Decisions to intern people or place them in assigned residence are not reconsidered automatically, but only at the request of the person concerned. Once an application has been put forward, the court or administrative board must examine it at the earliest possible moment."
18 There is some inherent flexibility in determining what "as soon as possible" means; for example, the timing might be affected by the need to set up a board in the first instance, or by the board's caseload.
Article 78, governing detention in occupied territory, provides slightly less detail than Article 43, but contains an internal reference to other provisions of the Convention. Article 78 provides: "Decisions regarding such assigned residence or internment shall be made according to a regular procedure to be prescribed by the Occupying Power in accordance with the provisions of the present Convention."
19 The Commentary to Article 78 suggests that "provisions of the present Convention" include Article 43 (even though Article 78 itself contains some duplication of rules in Article 43, such as twice-yearly review):
It is for the Occupying Power to decide on the procedure to be adopted; but it is not entirely free to do as it likes; it must observe the stipulations in Article 43, which contains a precise and detailed statement of the procedure to be followed when a protected person who is in the territory of a Party to the conflict when hostilities break out, is interned or placed in assigned residence. d.
Appeal of the initial determination
Article 43 is silent on whether a detainee held in the territory of a party to the conflict has the right to appeal a state's decision to detain him. Under Article 78, the occupying power's initial review process must offer the detainee the right to appeal a decision upholding the detention. Article 78 requires that "[t]his procedure shall include the right of appeal for the parties concerned. Appeals shall be decided with the least possible delay."
21
Although Article 78 is silent on which entity must perform the appeal, the Commentary to Article 78 assumes that the same type of body that performed the initial review-a court or an administrative board-will perform the appeal. In the words of the Commentary, the drafters left it "to the Occupying Power to entrust the consideration of appeals either to a 'court' or a 'board.' That means that the decision will never be left to one individual. It will be a joint decision, and this offers the protected persons a better guarantee of fair treatment."
22 This may be sensible as a practical matterstates may find it efficient to use the same body for both the initial and appellate reviews, using different reviewers at each level-but the plain language of Article 78 does not require it.
e.
Periodic review If the first and second level reviews of an individual's detention uphold the state's initial decision to detain the person, the state must review the individual's continued detention at least once every six months, whether or not the individual requests the review. The purpose of this requirement is, of course, to ensure that a state does not detain people longer than necessary, whether out of administrative incompetence, laziness, or bad faith.
Article 43 states: "If the internment or placing in assigned residence is maintained, the court or administrative board shall periodically, and at least twice yearly, give consideration to his or her case, with a view to the favourable amendment of the initial decision, if circumstances permit." 23 Article 78's language is less specific about the entity that must review the decision (with no reference to a board or court) and somewhat more flexible on the timing of the review. It is unclear why Article 78 builds in greater flexibility for review ("if possible every six months") than Article 43, which mandates review "at least twice yearly." One explanation might be that the Fourth Geneva Convention's drafters presumed that a state party generally will be in greater control of its own territory than it will be of occupied territory, and accordingly that a state will be better able to ensure periodic reviews in a timely manner for detainees in its territory during the conflict.
f.
Notice to other entities Finally, although not strictly a rule related to administrative detention procedures, Article 43 requires the detaining state to give notice to the Protecting Power of those protected persons it has interned. Article 43 states:
Unless the protected persons concerned object, the Detaining Power shall, as rapidly as possible, give the Protecting Power the names of any protected persons who have been interned . . . or who have been released from internment . . . . The decisions of the courts or boards mentioned in the first paragraph of the present Article shall also, subject to the same conditions, be notified as rapidly as possible to the Protecting Power. 25 Article 11 of the Fourth Geneva Convention contemplates that the ICRC may serve the humanitarian functions of the Protecting Power if states cannot agree on such a Power. 26 Additionally, Article 143 establishes that a detaining state must grant the ICRC access to interned protected persons, which presumes that the state will notify the ICRC of the names of such detainees. 27 These provisions serve as an additional check on the detaining state, because both the Protecting Power and the ICRC can monitor the custodial status of a detainee and can encourage the detaining state to comply with the periodic review provisions in the Fourth Geneva Convention.
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Notice of reason for detention
Additional Protocol I adds only one significant element to the processes contained in the Fourth Geneva Convention-notice to the individual detained of the reasons for his detention. Article 75(3) requires that "[a]ny person arrested, detained or interned for actions related to the armed conflict shall be informed promptly, in a language he understands, of the reasons why these measures have been taken."
28 Beyond basic fairness, the primary reason to provide an individual with notice of the reasons for his detention is to better enable him to contest his detention if he believes that the state has detained him improperly.
The reasons that the Detaining Power provides to the detainee may be relatively general. The Commentary to Article 75 notes: "Internees will therefore generally be informed of the reason for such measures in broad terms, such as legitimate suspicion, precaution, unpatriotic attitude, nationality, origin, etc. without any specific reasons being given."
29 One reason that states may have wanted to keep this requirement general is that, in certain cases, issues of classification or intelligence sources may preclude a state from providing specific information about the individual's situation. A state also has some flexibility regarding how quickly it must provide to the detainee the reasons for his detention. The Commentary suggests that "promptly" is an imprecise term, but anticipates that "ten days would seem the maximum period." 30 b.
End of detention
The only other provision of Article 75 that relates to administrative detention discusses how detention comes to an end. Article 75(3) basically recites the provisions of Articles 43 and 132 of the Fourth Geneva Convention on the release of detainees. Article 75(3) states that administrative detainees (other than those arrested for penal offenses) "shall be released with the minimum delay possible and in any event as soon as the circumstances justifying the arrest, detention or internment have ceased to exist." Of greater interest is the Commentary to Article 75, which recognizes that a state may detain an individual for extended periods of time and states:
Legal practice in most countries recognizes preventive custody, i.e., a period during which the police or the public prosecutor can detain a person in 28 Additional Protocol I, supra note 9, at art. 75(3). 29 custody without having to charge him with a specific accusation; in peacetime this period is no more than two or three days, but sometimes it is longer for particular offenses (acts of terrorism) and in time of armed conflict it is often prolonged.
31
B. Non-international Armed Conflict
As the ICRC paper on procedural rules for administrative detention notes, the law of war rules governing the procedural aspects of administrative detention in non-international armed conflict are extremely spare. Therefore, states conducting administrative detention in non-international armed conflict will be governed by their domestic laws, which generally include human rights provisions and due process requirements. Most states are parties to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which requires each state party to "respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized" in the ICCPR. 32 Article 9(4) of the ICCPR provides: "Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings before a court, in order that that court may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order his release if the detention is not lawful." However, "in time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed," a state may derogate from certain articles, including Article 9. There are no international rules or requirements for what procedures may or must replace Article 9 during such a derogation. Therefore, neither the law of war nor human rights law establishes bright-line and immutable rules for detention during non-international armed conflicts.
1.
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions
Article 3 of each of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions-referred to as "Common Article 3"-appears in treaties that govern international armed conflict, but the Article contains baseline rules that apply to noninternational armed conflict. 33 Common Article 3 contemplates that states (and indeed non-state actors) will detain individuals during noninternational armed conflict. While Common Article 3 provides important rules governing the treatment of those detained, it is silent on the procedures that parties to the conflict must follow regarding detention. 31 Id. at 876-77. 32 ICCPR, supra note 6, at art. 2(1). 33 See, e.g., Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 1, at art. 3. At the end of the armed conflict, all the persons who have been deprived of their liberty or whose liberty has been restricted for reasons related to such conflict, as well as those deprived of their liberty or whose liberty is restricted after the conflict for the same reasons, shall enjoy the protection of Articles 5 and 6 until the end of such deprivation or restriction of liberty. 34 The treaty provides virtually no guidance, however, on the procedural rules governing administrative detention. Articles 4 through 6 address the treatment of those detained for reasons related to the armed conflict, but do not contain rules regarding the detention process.
It is clear that, with regard to the law of war, states are bound by a reasonably robust set of procedural rules when they administratively detain protected persons during international armed conflict, but are bound by virtually no such rules during non-international armed conflict. Part IV, infra, will discuss one possible way to address this disparity.
III. STATE PRACTICE
Beyond treaties, customary international law (CIL) offers another possible source of rules binding on states. For a rule to constitute CIL, two elements must be present: widespread and virtually uniform state practice; and, a belief that such practice is required as a matter of law. 35 Rather than undertake the comprehensive effort required to assess whether any procedural rules governing administrative detention have become CIL in the law 
36
This Part reviews administrative detention laws, rules, and practices by international or coalition operations and by individual states, without focusing on whether those particular administrative detention practices occurred in international or non-international armed conflict. A review of the rules and practices suggests that the real world conduct of administrative detentions follows fewer rules than the ICRC paper on administrative detention argues for. 37 Nevertheless, it is possible to divine certain core procedural elements that virtually all of the examples include.
A. International or Coalition Administrative Detention Rules
KFOR
The NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) deployed in the wake of a 78-day NATO air campaign that began in March 1999. The campaign was 36 The ICRC study on customary international humanitarian law, in a proffered rule prohibiting arbitrary detention, cites practice in this area.
JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (2005)
. Some of that practice, however, appears to reflect a predictable decision by states to incorporate their obligations under Article 75 of Additional Protocol I into their military manuals. In other cases, it is not clear that the practice the ICRC cites occurred in armed conflict. Possibly relevant practice in this study includes: (1) A 1991 Memorandum of Understanding on the application of international humanitarian law between Croatia and the SFRY required that all civilians be treated in accordance with Additional Protocol I, Article 75. There is no indication in the study whether these two states complied with this undertaking. HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, § 2695; (2) A 1992 Memorandum of Understanding between parties to the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Again, there is no indication in the study whether the parties complied with this undertaking. Id. § 2696; (3) Canada, New Zealand, Sweden, and Switzerland have incorporated the language of Article 75 on "informed without delay in a language he understands" into their military manuals, but they may have done so simply because those states are parties to Additional Protocol I. See id. § § 2697-701; (4) Spain's penal code provides for punishment of anyone who, during armed conflict, fails to inform protected persons clearly and without delay of their situation. The use of the term "protected persons" suggests this rule applies only during international armed conflict. Id. § 2705; (5) Colombia's "instructors' manual" states that "persons in preventive detention shall be brought before a judge in the 36 hours following arrest." Id. § 2728; (6) An Uganda National Resistance Army Statute provides that a person subject to military law who fails to bring a detainee's case before the proper authority for investigation is subject to punishment. The context in which this rule would operate is not clear. Id. § 2731; (7) The Argentine, Canadian, German, New Zealand, United Kingdom, and U.S. military manuals repeat the essence of Article 43 (and, for the United States, Article 78 during occupation). See id. § 2755-62; and (8) The U.S. Field Manual (1956) adds that "'competent bodies' to review the internment or assigned residence of protected persons may be created with advisory functions only, leaving the final decision to a high official of the Government." Id. § 2762. This calls the requirement of "independence" into question. 37 Detention Directive 42 states that an individual may be detained under the authority of COMKFOR if he constitutes a threat to KFOR or to a safe and secure environment in Kosovo, if the civilian authorities in Kosovo are unable or unwilling to take responsibility for the matter, and if the person's detention is necessary because the threat cannot reasonably be addressed by lesser means. When those criteria are met, "COMKFOR authority to detain will only be used as a last resort." 44 Additionally, Directive 42 provides: "[COMKFOR] will continue to use the authority to detain but only in cases where it is absolutely necessary. It must be noted that this authority to detain is a military decision, not a judicial one." 45 The Directive adds: "The fact that a person may have information of intelligence value by itself is not a basis for detention." 46 The reference to detention as a "last resort" and the requirement that detention be based on security needs and be performed "only where it is absolutely necessary" seems consistent with the standards in the Fourth Geneva Convention, Articles 42 and 78. Additionally, detainees have the right to be informed of the reasons for their detention in writing, and to be notified in writing of subsequent decisions about their detention. 47 b.
Initial review of detention
The Directive allows KFOR on-site commanders to order detention for up to eighteen hours, and "allows MNB [Multi-National Brigade] commanders to detain people for up to 72 hours on their own authority . . . ."
48
The COMKFOR must approve continued detention beyond 72 hours. COMKFOR can order detention for up to 30 days, subject to extension without an outside limit. Once COMKFOR orders someone detained, "no one may release that person during the ordered detention period without the written approval of COMKFOR." 49 These rules provide greater operational detail than any rules in the Fourth Geneva Convention. Of note, they require a high-level commander to authorize continued detention beyond 72 hours-generally a shorter time than one might expect for individuals detained during a conflict. 43 KFOR Press Release, supra note 40. 44 Amnesty FRY Report, supra note 41, at 12. 45 Amnesty Serbia Report, supra note 41, at 8. 46 Amnesty FRY Report, supra note 41, at 13. 47 See KFOR Press Release, supra note 40. 48 Amnesty Serbia Report, supra note 41, at 8. 49 Id.
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In making detention decisions, COMKFOR may consult a Detention Review Panel chaired by the KFOR legal advisor and whose members are designated by COMKFOR. The panel reviews requests for detention and makes recommendations to COMKFOR. The legal advisor makes independent recommendations apart from the panel recommendation. It appears that COMKFOR may adopt or reject these recommendations. 50 Detainees may submit petitions to COMKFOR regarding their detention, and individuals making detention decisions shall consider such submissions.
c.
Additional procedures related to detention
Although the Directive does not appear to provide for a formal appeal process or periodic review of extended detention, NATO press releases state that detainees may notify family members of their detention and may access legal advisors at their own expense. 51 Additionally, KFOR makes the names of detainees available to the ICRC. [I am] content that we are maintaining an acceptable balance between a Force Commander's necessary powers to detain and the essential rights of those detained. On the specific issue of the legality of detention operations carried out by KFOR, I have nothing to add further to my previous correspondence . . . . The relevant procedures remain in place for the exercise of KFOR's powers with regard to detention, including through Directive 42, which places the correct emphasis upon the need for correct treatment, whilst ensuring that detentions are lawful and fully respectful of international law. Standard for detention, initial review of detention, and notice of reasons
The Ordinance permitted INTERFET to detain several categories of individuals, including those who posed a "security risk." 55 According to Australian Defense Force officer Michael Kelly, "security detainees were subject to a 'show cause' procedure that was regulated and managed by INTERFET . . . . If a security detainee was held for more than 96 hours COMINTERFET or his delegate was required to certify that the risk posed by the detainee warranted that the detainee be held for a longer period." COMINTERFET made a decision, "and within 144 hours of being detained, COMINTERFET informed the detainee in writing of the grounds on which the certificate was to be issued." 57 b.
Ability to contest detention
After the detainee was notified of the grounds of the forthcoming certificate, INTERFET gave the detainee up to seven days, or such longer time as COMINTERFET considered reasonable, to show cause why a certificate should not be issued. If the detainee asked for assistance, the Defending Officer of the INTERFET Detainee Management Unit was available to assist the detainee in responding to the "show cause" document. In some cases, the Officer succeeded in establishing that there was insufficient evidence against the detainee. The Ordinance did not provide for a separate appeal process or for judicial review.
Notice to ICRC
INTERFET gave notice to the ICRC of any individual it detained for more than 96 hours. Indeed, the relevant provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention generally governed the administrative detention regime. 59 The annexed letters describe a broad range of tasks that MNF-I may undertake to counter "ongoing security threats," including "internment where this is necessary for imperative reasons of security." 60 The letter from then-Secretary Powell states that the "forces that make up the MNF are and will remain committed at all times to act consistently with their obligations under the law of armed conflict, including the Geneva Conventions. Appeal of the initial determination Detainees may request an appeal of their detention in writing, and may include a written statement of their reasons for appealing. A Combined Review and Release Board (CRRB), a seven-officer, majority-Iraqi board, reviews the appeal; the detainees do not appear. 65 The CRRB makes a recommendation on each appeal to the Deputy Commanding General for Detainee Affairs, who makes the final detention decision. Detainees in Iraq receive review of their detention every six months. These periodic reviews occur in the form of a Multi-National Force Review Committee (MNFRC), a three-officer board that assesses the threat posed by each detainee. The MNFRC reads the case summary to the detainee at the review. The detainee may make an oral statement to the Committee, may present evidence, and may ask questions of witnesses. The Committee informs the detainee of the final decision within 45 days of the review.
Under Iraqi law, MNF-I must release individuals from security internment or transfer them to the Iraqi criminal justice system no later than 18 months from the date of detention, unless a Joint Detention Committee, which is staffed by ambassadorial and ministerial level U.S., UK, and Iraqi officials, approves further detention. 66 Finally, CPA Memorandum No. 3 guarantees the ICRC access to internees.
67
B. State Practice of Administrative Detention in Armed Conflict
Many states have enacted administrative detention laws, but it often is difficult to determine whether a state's domestic laws contemplating administrative detention apply to (or have been used in) situations of armed conflict. This section focuses on four examples of security laws or procedures that either were crafted specifically for armed conflict or that appear to have been used in situations that constituted armed conflict.
Israel
Israel has two laws that authorize it to conduct security detentions-an emergency powers law and an "incarceration of illegal combatants" law. Under both laws, a detainee may have his detention reviewed by a court. Under Israel's emergency powers law, the Ministry of Defense (MOD) may detain a person during a "state of emergency" when the Minister has "reasonable cause to believe that reasons of state security or public security require." 70 The MOD can detain individuals for up to six months. 71 The detention order is subject to judicial review by the President of the District Court within forty-eight hours of a person's detention and can be set aside if the court finds that it is not based on reasons of state security or was made in bad faith. The detainee may appeal his detention to the Israeli Supreme Court. If the court or courts uphold the initial detention, the District Court will review the order every three months. The proceedings are not public, and may depart from the regular rules of evidence. 73 The IDF must inform the individual of the detention order, which includes the grounds for detention, as soon as possible. 74 ii.
The detainee may submit to the Chief of General Staff's delegate arguments opposing the order. 75 That officer must evaluate the detainee's arguments and bring them before the Chief of General Staff, who must review the arguments and, if he finds no reasonable cause to believe that the detainee is an illegal combatant, must quash the detention order. 76 the Chief, any time after he grants the order, decides that there is no longer reasonable cause to believe that the detainee is an illegal combatant, or there are special grounds to justify his release, he must quash the order.
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iii. Periodic review of detention and access to counsel
If the Chief of General Staff upholds the detention, the IDF must bring the detainee before a District Court judge within fourteen days of the order and once every six months thereafter. 78 The court will order him released if it will not harm state security or if there are special grounds justifying his release. 79 The detainee can appeal decisions to the Supreme Court.
80
There is no outer limit on the time for which the IDF may detain the person. The detainee is entitled to counsel no later than seven days before being brought before the District Court judge. 81 The Israeli Minister of Justice may limit the pool of lawyers to those people authorized to serve as defense counsel in military courts.
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Regarding classified evidence, a legal brief in the U.S. Supreme Court case of Boumediene v. Bush describes Israeli practice as follows:
At several stages of a detention proceeding, Israel's need to protect classified information can conflict with the detainee's need to confront such information in order to challenge the State's evidence effectively. Classified information is protected whenever its disclosure could harm State security; but the decision to limit a detainee's access to such information must be made by the judge. Thus, detainees have the right to know the reason for their detention unless a judge finds that the information would jeopardize security. Detainees have the right to be present in court for all legal proceedings unless a judge finds that State security requires otherwise. Where security concerns warrant, judges can withhold evidence from a detainee and elect to review it in camera and ex parte instead. . . . [I]f the court concludes that evidence was improperly classified, or that portions of it need not be withheld, the court will order the State to reveal such evidence. In such a case, the State still can refuse to disclose the evidence, but only if it is willing instead to free the detainee. 83 77 Id. at art. 4. 78 Id. at arts. 5(a), 5(c). 79 Id. at art. 5(c). 80 Id. at art. 5(d). 81 Id. at art. 6(a). 82 Id. at art. 6(b). 83 
